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THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF MORAL
PROGRESS.

In clearing away the obstacles that have obscured economic laws, the economist is forced to investigate all the problems that cluster around industrial life. He cannot get at the secret springs of economic activity without going beyond the limits which, in a strict sense, bound his science. When the tendencies were strong in economics to seek a physical basis for all economic theories, he was forced to become a physicist, and even an agricultural chemist, in order that he might determine the principles which regulate the production of wealth on its physical side.

Of recent years a strong tendency has arisen to lay stress upon the subjective side of economics and hence the economist has become a psychologist and has investigated many psychological problems which have been neglected by psychologists with metaphysical tendencies. Out of all this has come a new method of psychological investigation and the formulation of laws that throw new light upon some old problems, the solution of which was not possible by accepted methods.

With the vantage ground thus obtained, I desire to re-examine the principles of ethics and to modify them by the new doctrines that have arisen from investigations purely economic.

Ethics in the past has been closely associated with transcendental philosophy and has borrowed its terminology, ideas, and concept of mental activity from that mode of thinking. A large part of the same phenomena has been investigated by economists, men of instincts and education other than those possessed by the group of thinkers called philosophers. It is, therefore, no matter of wonder that these two essentially different types of thinking should use different terms to express similar ideas, nor that there should be a liability to confusion when they meet upon the common ground of ethics.

Looked at from a philosophical point of view, moralists are either intuitionist or utilitarian. This distinction, however, cannot serve as a basis for the present paper, because it does not discuss the origin or binding force of the moral standard ; it merely points out the changes in the degrees of utility which at different times accompany a given act and the effect of these changes on the conduct of individuals. Here is a sphere which belongs properly to economists and in which they can justly demand the attention of moralists. From an economic standpoint, both these schools of morals are types of a mode of thinking which prevailed under primitive conditions, before industrial affairs assumed a dominant place in society. I shall call this mode of viewing moral questions, primitive morality, contrasting it with social morality, the morality of an industrial society. Both kinds of morality are, in a measure, social, because moral actions are always modified by the economic environment, but the want of a better classification compels me to use the latter term in a more limited sense to denote the type of morality consciously associated with economic activity. How, then, are primitive and social morality to be distinguished?

Morality is intimately connected with pleasures and pains. Certain actions give us a surplus of pleasure and we are inclined to choose them. If right conduct always gave the greatest surplus of pleasure, our choice would be simple,

and there would be no science of ethics. But too often the surplus of pleasure seems to be on the side of wrong action, and then the ethical difficulties begin. How can the mental attitude in this case be so changed that the surplus will be on the right side?

Let us suppose that the wrong action gives fifteen units of immediate pleasure, with which are associated two units of pain, and that the right action gives thirteen units of pleasure, from which must be deducted three units of associated pain. Here plainly the tendency is in the wrong direction. How shall it be corrected? One way is through asceticism. The actor is inculcated with a philosophy that leads him to despise pleasure; he relinquishes worldly aims and ambitions; and emphasises the love of virtue for virtue's sake. This mental action, when carried to an extreme, causes men to abstain from economic activity. It leads men to avoid, at any cost, all influences which can create temptation and encourages them to pass a life absorbed in meditation. In these and many other ways this doctrine seeks to reduce the surplus of pleasure on the side of wrong, so that the surplus of pleasure will be on the side of right, thus insuring the proper action.

Another way of reducing the surplus of pleasure on the side of wrong is through an emphasis of the requital for bad conduct. With bad actions are associated the evil consequences which flow from them, and in the mind is created a vivid picture of the ultimate effects of bad actions. Hence, when the individual is prompted by the thought of a surplus of present pleasure to enter upon some evil deed, the association of future pains with the evil act reduces the surplus of pleasure which would come from it, thus strengthening the motive for right actions.

The idea of requital for evil deeds is impressed upon us mainly from two sources—the discipline of consequences and our criminal law. The unavoidable consequences of evil deeds have given rise to the theory that nature inflicts a proper punishment for the breaking of her laws. The doer of evil in

some natural way meets a fitting requital from the moral order he has violated. The loss of friends and property, sickness, suffering, and similar misfortunes form prominent elements in the plan of natural retribution and show that the acceptance of a wrong moral principle necessarily results in the destruction of the evil doer. This kind of morality is best impressed by the early literature of the race, which pictures men in simple environments without fixed institutions, and by simple lessons from science, especially from physiology.

The progress of civilization has brought the State into the foreground as a great source of requital for evil. We are not willing to wait until the natural retribution falls upon the head of the evil doer but desire to inflict some present evil of sufficient magnitude to hold him and others in check. A penalty, therefore, is attached to each crime through which the evil act has a surplus of pain instead of pleasure. Every system of jurisprudence has this thought as its basis. The punishment for each act must be painful enough to deter the doer of evil from his intended act; but not so great that he should prefer to commit a great instead of a small offence.

The early types of morality thus seek to secure a conformity to the moral law in two ways: by educating the actor, through some form of ascetic doctrine, to be indifferent to pleasure, and by associating evil results with the keen pleasures which so often lead the actor astray. It should be noticed that both of these remedies act primarily upon the surplus on the side of wrong conduct. They tend to reduce the pleasure of living by shutting out one class of pleasures without offering any substitute for it. The right action gets the excess of pleasure on its side, not because of any increase of the pleasure from it, but because of a decrease of the surplus pleasure from the wrong action. The natural inclination of the culprit to do the wrong may be as strong as ever; he merely yields to the superior force of society and sighs for a world in which his stronger desires could be gratified without any restrictive conditions.

That the moral regeneration of the world demands more than this unwilling conformity to the moral law is recognized by all, yet, so long as the current ethical systems with their primitive conceptions maintain their ground, just so long will that regeneration be retarded. A conscious recognition of new conditions could hardly be expected from those who are imbued with ascetic ideals, but even as noted an iconoclast as Bentham got no further in his solution than to attach a penalty to wrong action large enough to cause the actor to choose the smaller pleasure which right action is supposed naturally to give. He did not seek for any laws determining the increase of utility, but assumed that the pleasure of wrong action was so great that some requital from society was needed to reduce the net pleasure of wrong actions below that obtained from right actions. In this way his system became merely a system of jurisprudence—a necessary adjunct to the natural requitals which nature inflicts for the violation of her laws, not a system of morals in the true sense of the word.

These errors are the natural outcome of the education and environment of the early moralists. Ethics has always been regarded a part of philosophy, and philosophers have confined themselves too much to introspective methods and are inclined to believe that elements are fixed which an inductive method would show to be changing. The laws of utility which lie at the basis of morality have never attracted the attention of philosophers. Though a part of psychology, they have been overlooked by psychologists, while economists from the necessities of their investigations have been compelled to devote much attention to these laws. In this way studies which are purely economic have helped to clear up a neglected part of morals, and thus may assist in laying the foundation of true ethical science.

Economic theory can throw light upon moral problems if it can show how the higher pleasures obtain the power to resist strong passions. It can thus show how moral ideas grow, or under what conditions the conscience becomes

more efficient. If the same psychological principles act in the consumption of wealth as in morals, moral progress must depend upon the same conditions as economic progress. The mechanism of economic progress is best seen in the theory of consumption, especially in discussing the standard of life. I desire, therefore, to call attention to this part of economic theory and to formulate a few of its laws as a basis for subsequent discussion.*

1. *Complementary Goods.* The pleasure secured from an harmonious group of articles is much greater than the sum of utilities which can be obtained from their separate consumption. The pleasure derived from the consumption of each article is not a unit separate from the pleasure derived from every other article. Meat, bread, potatoes and coffee consumed at one meal give greater pleasure than if each article was consumed in isolation. A suit of clothes, harmonious in color and form, gives a greater utility to its possessor than the same articles would give if they were not adjusted to one another. We seek to unite isolated articles into harmonious groups so that their utilities may blend. There results a synthesis of mutually complementary elements, the joint utility of which is greater and more intense than the sum of the separate utilities of its components. Goods do not form a complement † in consumption unless the gratification derived from the group as a unit is greater than the sum of isolated utilities of the parts making up the group.

2. *The Imputation of Utility.* As the utility of each complementary group is greater than the sum of the utilities of its parts, we must impute to the parts a higher utility than

* See Patten, *The Consumption of Wealth* and *The Theory of Dynamic Economics*, Nos. 4 and 11 of the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Political Economy and Public Law Series.

† The word "complement" is here used to convey the idea of an harmonious grouping of goods through which, by the blending of the utilities of the separate articles, a higher utility and a greater amount of pleasure is obtained. This is but an extension of the recognized meaning of the word in the expression a "full complement," that is, a complete and perfect group.

they would have in isolation. In fact many articles which consumed alone would cause pain, as a part of a group can have a high utility imputed to them. Salt, pepper, and other condiments are notable examples of this class; being by themselves sources of pain, all their utility in the group is imputed to them. The imputation of utility is a subjective act, depending upon the fact that complementary goods afford more utility in their joint consumption than in isolation. We must distribute the added utility among the members of the group in some way that will satisfy subjective feelings. The primary principle upon which we act seems to be that we impute to each article the difference in the total utility of the complement with and without the article in question. This principle must be modified by many secondary laws which need not be discussed, as their consideration is of little moment to the subject in hand.

3. *The Mechanism of the Standard of Life.* The key of economic progress depends upon the measure of the standard of life and upon the laws that determine what articles or groups of goods shall form a part of the standard. We try to distribute our income so as to give us the maximum pleasure. No article or group will remain a part of the standard unless the excess of its utility above the cost is about the same as that of other parts of the standard. The primitive man has but few intense pleasures and only a few goods that are really complementary to one another, while the cost of most goods is so great that they are shut out of use. Under these conditions the standard of life will be low, because few articles will give enough surplus pleasure over cost to create a sufficient inducement to procure them. But, as soon as the primitive appetites and passions are weakened and the formation of new groups of goods increase the surplus of utility derived from them, the excess of pleasure above cost becomes, in many cases, so nearly equal that the articles or groups become a fixed part of the standard of life. The new pleasures will be as strong as the old and there will be no tendency to

reduce the variety of consumption even if industrial depression makes temporary reductions in the income.

4. *The Relative Size of the Complementary Groups of Pleasure and Pain.* It is a fact of importance that groups of pains are much larger than those of pleasures. It is easy for any one to aggregate all the evils of life and impute the whole group to some one cause. It is not uncommon for persons to impute to several causes in turn the aggregate of pains from which they suffer. The applicant for a pension may be honest in thinking that his service in the army is the cause of all the evils from which he has since then suffered. In this way the evils of life are exaggerated and in many cases a surplus of pain is created where a more accurate method of accounting would show a surplus of pleasure. The groups of pleasures are relatively small and cannot be easily increased. A large complementary group of pleasures seem unreal and usually the pleasures remain a mere aggregate and do not blend into a single unit the utility of which would be much greater than the sum of the utility of the isolated parts. The progress of civilization tends to enlarge these harmonious groups of pleasures, but, as yet, this progress has been so limited that they are yet much less in size than those of pain.

The larger relative size of our groups of pain is due to the survival of feelings from primitive conditions. Our complementary groups of pain are more instinctive than those of pleasure and the association of ideas with pains is also stronger and more vivid. The original state of war that Hobbes emphasizes points to a primitive condition where the instincts to guard against enemies were more important than those that lead men to seek pleasure in one another's company. The early economic conditions also strengthened this tendency. Where the food supply is irregular the imagination is usually the most active faculty. Fasting or starving intensifies the unreal vision of a strong imagination. In such a state a man can more readily throw all his evils into one complementary group and impute it to any

source. A regular food supply weakens this kind of imagination, The consumer now lives more in the present and the chain of evils that affects him is shortened and broken.

The increase in the sum of pleasures which society has to enjoy, or, to express the idea in economic terms, the increase of the standard of life depends upon these four economic causes. The simple pleasures of primitive life depend mainly upon sensation. By association we learn that certain articles are harmonious and with them we form complements through which the pleasure of the articles is greatly increased. Certain inharmonious articles are eliminated from consumption or are, perhaps, united into groups of their own, in a way that will not interfere with the leading groups with which they are out of harmony. It is usually the case that when two small groups are united into one, through progress in consumption, some article must be omitted or the increase of total utility due to the formation of the larger group will not be secured. In increasing the variety of food, the pleasure obtained is not merely the sensation of eating, but the pleasant feeling or increased utility which follows the meal. The digestion of the food determines largely the sum of pleasure due to the meal ; and if two groups, each an harmonious unit, are discordant when consumed together, not only is the pleasure of the meal reduced, but the consequences may be disastrous.

Perhaps the best illustration of discordant groups is furnished by the sour, heavy foods that harmonize with strong liquors and the diet of the abstaining classes in which sugar occupies a leading place. With a free use of liquor, coarse food can be washed down and digested, but such food will not harmonize with a free use of sugar. A marked opposition thus arises between a liquor diet and a sugar diet and consumers are forced to choose between them.*

The raising of the standard of life involves, therefore, the ejecting from our consumption of articles out of harmony

* See Patten, the *Economic Basis of Prohibition*, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. July, 1891.

with the new conditions, though these articles are often those that, by themselves, were sources of great pleasure. The choice must be made between the pleasure of some single article and that of some complementary group of goods which tends to displace that article. The primitive man gets his pleasure from some one or few articles and adjusts his other consumption to this pleasure. The civilized man, however, ejects those leading pleasures which depend mainly upon sensation, choosing instead larger groups, the parts of which separately have less utility, but, being harmonious, give a larger total utility. The disuse of liquor and tobacco by so many individuals is a notable instance of the change of which I speak. These articles are sources of great pleasure, but are so inharmonious with the consumption of sugar and other articles, which enter into large groups, that there is a rapidly increasing tendency to omit them altogether. The steady decrease in the use of vinegar and of fat foods has the same explanation.

It also seems possible that there will arise as marked an opposition between the use of meat and milk as there is now between liquor and sugar. A century ago the diet of the common people was largely vegetable, meat being used only on rare occasions. Under these conditions milk and other dairy products were the main source from which animal food could be obtained. Such articles, therefore, were largely used to give relish to vegetable products, milk or butter being a leading element in most kinds of seasoning. The recent improvement in economic conditions has made meat the basis of the diet of all classes, and, as a result, dairy products do not furnish an element of which there is a lack, but one that is already well supplied from other sources. Milk, moreover, sours so readily that it does not unite easily into large groups, such as are now the leading elements of our diet. It had its proper place in the diet of our ancestors, but must be ejected from our own if we mean to avail ourselves of the choice which there is now between the best groups.

I mention these seeming irrelevant facts to show the conditions upon which a higher standard of life depends. It is not necessarily a choice between articles good or bad, nor is it merely the element of cost that determines the standard, but it is a choice between small and large groups. When larger groups are formed by uniting the smaller groups into one, some of the leading elements of pleasure in the smaller groups, perhaps the main element, must be thrown out so that the consumption may be harmonious and the total utility increased.

From an economic standpoint, the difference between a good and bad consumer lies in the willingness to eject elements from the consumption which do not unite readily into large groups. Some consumers accept the increasing variety which improved economic conditions permit, and from the new articles as well as from the old get the pleasurable sensation which their consumption affords. They lose in this way the greater pleasure which the formation of their goods into complements would give and suffer, in addition, the ultimate results which flow from an inharmonious consumption. The good consumer ejects the discordant elements, forms larger groups, and gets the greater pleasure, present as well as future, that follows his wiser action.

A correct imputation of utility is a great aid to this end. Suppose two groups of three articles each can be united into a larger group if article A of the first group be omitted. Articles A, B and C of the first group give respectively eight, six and four units of pleasure; D E and F of the second group give each five units of pleasure. Because of the greater harmony of the consumption, the new group without A will give forty-five units of pleasure. Of these forty-five units, twenty-five are fixed and belong to the five articles according to the pleasure derived from their separate consumption. The other twenty units, however, result from the harmony of the larger group, and this amount must be imputed by the consumer to the five articles in whatever order he may determine. If he distributes it in the best

manner, each of the five articles will have imputed to it a utility of nine units. Then, as each of the five articles has a higher utility than A (eight units), there will be no inclination to break up the larger group to get the pleasure of consuming A. The larger the group the more pleasure can be imputed to any one element, thus increasing the power to resist any disintegration of the group into smaller parts, in each of which some crude but strong pleasure is the dominant element.

The necessity of renunciation upon which moralists have put so much emphasis, arises from the need of giving up single intense pleasures to acquire a complement of pleasures, weak in isolation, but strong when united into a harmonious group. When the new complement is formed and the imputation of utility changed to correspond to the new condition the need of this particular form of renunciation ceases. The new complement will have a greater surplus of pleasure than the old passion had and will naturally be chosen.

I have described in full the conditions that create a higher standard of life, not because the economic and the moral standards are the same, but because the same psychological principles act in each case. Moreover, there is no distinct line of demarcation between the two. The small and simple groups that are plainly economic first attract the attention of the consumer and then he begins to appreciate the larger groups in which the moral and economic blend, finally reaching the largest groups that are distinctly moral. They are all created on the same plan and have their growth conditioned by the changes in the mental organization of the race which accompany its progress. As the smaller groups unite to form the larger, there are always discordant elements to eject and a sum of added pleasure which must be imputed to the several members of the new group. Thus the consumer becomes a better consumer, or, if we have passed into the groups which form the ethical world, the moral judgment and conscience become more active elements in forming our characters.

Of the groups partly economic and partly moral in their character, perhaps, the most powerful is that we designate by the word "home." A home is not a simple pleasure, but it is a great group of many pleasures, so many that it would be impossible to describe them in detail, and yet the word, with the meaning we attach to it, is of modern origin. It is said that many languages are without it. This means that in early times, and in many nations at present, the numerous pleasures that are now blended in this group were isolated pleasures or members of small groups associated with other objects. Yet a process of ejection and of amalgamation of pleasures has gone on until the new complement is strong enough to be able to hold in check the strongest of the passions. It has modified many pleasures, changed their character, and has also created many which could not have arisen under other conditions.

A similar ideal is conveyed by the word "comfort." We want to possess just enough of each article in daily use that a harmonious whole may be formed. In this way a complement is formed through which a multitude of little conveniences and pleasures are made a part of the standard of life. The term "credit" denotes a powerful complement which has been created by conditions which are purely economic and yet in time have assumed a moral aspect. "Saving," in the beginning a purely economic ideal, has now so many pleasures resulting from it, that few complements are so interwoven with our whole social prosperity. Cleanliness also is not a simple pleasure, but is a complementary group which has grown up out of economic conditions. Without any distinctively moral backing, it has radically changed our consumption, and, perhaps, has been the cause of ejecting more discordant elements than any other means.

Our political ideals are also rapidly becoming groups of importance. The term "nation" brings up many of our growing pleasures which are uniting into a single group. The feelings that most people have for the city in which they

live are destined to grow even more rapidly. Our parks, streets, and public buildings, as well as other features of city life, create in us strong feelings which in time will become parts of a single complement. Then we shall eliminate from city life many of those disagreeable elements which are now a necessity because they are prominent parts of the smaller groups of pleasures that influence its citizens.

The church and schools are also growing social complementary groups which are centering about themselves strong pleasures that otherwise would be weak isolated feelings. Like other complements, they help us to suppress many discordant elements which are controlling forces so long as the groups of pleasures are small. We must always weaken by disintegration some strong feelings before new and larger complements are formed. Our strong primitive feelings are the obstacles that prevent social progress.

From the foregoing it will be seen that there are, in morals, two active instincts or principles with two underlying conditions accompanying their working. The latter come from the economic world, the former, though also active there, are seen in their purest form in morals. The conditions to morality lie in the size of the complements of pleasures and in the equality of the pleasures forming the complements. The principles shaping the action of the will are the ejection of discordant elements and the correct imputation of pleasures. The economic creates the possibility of the larger groups of pleasures, while the moral drives out the discordant elements, through which alone the formation of larger groups is possible.

The growth of the instinct to discard inharmonious elements from our consumption aids in the acquirement of a tender conscience ; this being the name we give in morals to the instinct to eject discordant elements. The moral ideals are formed on the same plan as the complementary groups of our consumption. We create in our imagination ideal conditions where many of the pleasures of life are brought in one group. The elements of this group are collected

from widely different and conflicting sources which cannot blend into one unit until some of the elements are dropped from the picture and others are reduced to a more subordinate place. Only those who have acquired the habit of summarily ejecting discordant elements can form the highest ideals or have the character needed to realize them.

The imputation of utility is also active in the formation of moral ideals. When a moral element is associated with a complement of goods, most of the utility derived from them may be imputed to it. With the progress of civilization each of the virtues enters more of the complements of pleasures, and as the moral ideals become distinct and clear, the various complements of goods are bound together through their moral elements. A moral complement is formed which aggregates in itself the whole utility of living. It is therefore possible to impute to any act a sum of pleasure greater than what can be derived from violating the moral principle. The doing of the right now becomes natural and the will is said to be strong.

It is, however, a mere figure of speech to talk of a weak will or a strong will. Wills differ not in their strength, but in the motives that control them, and the conditions under which they act. Wills do not grow like muscles. They show their superiority by the forethought they exercise in creating a protection against a sudden rise of passion. Ethical education is an education not of the will, but of the instincts and tastes that influence its action. An equilibrium of motives must be acquired before the will can act properly. The motives must be brought into harmonious relation and be of equal strength before the moral character reaches its perfection. The will is always weak when compared with the strength of our prominent passions. If we wish to turn the scale in the right direction, we must get an equilibrium among the lower motives and have the instincts properly developed and balanced.

Primitive morality pictures the will like a strong house, braced and barred so as to withstand every blast of the

storm. Social morality would picture it like a house protected by a forest. The wind can whistle around it, but its force is broken so that it can do no harm. The former attributes to the strength of the will what the latter gives to its forethought. The one makes it, in a measure, a physical quality; the other emphasizes its subjective nature. But the will is not to be thought of as passive, it is always active, though its leading activities are indirect. The productive power of an individual depends not so much on his muscular development as on the indirect preparation for the work, on his stock of goods, tools, buildings and materials. So, in consumption, the moral action depends not so much on the strength of the will, as on the size of the complements that have been formed by the indirect action of the will. These large complements are the result of the will's action in ejecting discordant elements, and in imputing the added pleasure in a way which makes the surplus of pleasure from these groups greater than from the older and smaller groups. If this work has been properly done, the choice of the right action is as easy as it is for a capitalist with his saving instinct properly developed, to choose the best form of production, when the choice involves greater or smaller quantities of capital. The creation of these complements is to the moral man what the tools and machines are to the workman. They change the line of least resistance, and enable results to be secured, which, otherwise, would be obtained only with great effort, if at all.

We can now return to the leading idea of the paper, with the hope of making some applications to the ethical training of children.* Two plans are possible, by which right conduct may be encouraged. On the one hand, the requital for evil deeds may be emphasized, a vivid picture of future punishment created, and thus the pleasure of the wrong action can be reduced by its associated evils, until the greater surplus of pleasure is on the side of right action. On the other

* Compare with De Garmo's, *Ethical Training in the Public Schools*.—ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY, March, 1892.

hand, the pleasure of right action may be increased by enlarging the complementary groups of pleasures, and thus the instincts and motives that induce the actor naturally to choose the right are strengthened. The first plan is best realized in our moral literature and criminal law ; the second. in our economic activities.

Simplicity, and not variety of pleasures, is represented in our moral literature as the highest ideals of life, and thus the large complements of pleasures that are mainstays of a higher morality are concealed from view, or even worse, through the influence of ascetic ideals, pleasures as such are despised, and our complements of pleasures are reduced in size. The simple virtues of primitive men, with their strong passions and crude pleasures, are held up as models, when the more refined characters of modern life really possess a greater educational value. The young have been held to the right through their imagination, and the fear of the natural requital for evil deeds ; the mature, who have passed beyond the imaginative period, by their fear of the criminal law.

The reduction of crime, however, is due more to the increase of economic activity, and to the consequent possibility of regular employment, than to the rigorous enforcement of our laws. Three solid meals a day break down the sympathy with theft, destructive revenge, and other crimes against property and good order.

The increase of our economic activities, moreover, changes the associations we have with the future. The primitive man associates pleasure with the present, and retribution with the future. The economic man thinks of the future as the place where he can realize the pleasure for which he is now preparing. The first man enjoys to-day and suffers to-morrow, while the other works to-day and enjoys to-morrow ; his capital, the future goods of to-day, will then be his present goods, and ready for consumption. The imagination of the one will fill the future with horrid pictures of suffering which face him as a retribution of his past deeds ; the imagi-

nation of the other creates an economic paradise where he will be exempt from present woes. Will the same literature serve as moral food for both of these classes? Must it not differ in character as widely as Dante's "Inferno" does from Plato's "Ideal Republic," or Bellamy's "Looking Backwards"?

Thus, in spite of the emphasis given to the primitive ideals and to the kind of imagination they demand, it is doubtful if moral progress of modern nations is due to these agencies. The trend of events was against the popular remedies for moral evils, and, if they had been the only force in action, there might have been a retrogression instead of a progression. The unseen growth of economic forces, however, has more than compensated for this possible loss. The larger complements of pleasures have made us moral in a natural way. With a greater surplus of present pleasure gradually forming upon the side of the right conduct, we have less need of an appeal to motives that revive our primitive feelings, and force us to fight the moral battle without the protection that our present economic environment can give.

The moral education should begin with lessons from the economic world, because the mechanism of morality is the same as that of the standard of life. Economic activity exercises the faculties which, at a later period, become moral. This education should begin with the small groups of pleasures which are vivid realities to the child, and seek to unite them gradually into larger complements. In this way, not only will the sum of pleasure be greatly augmented, but, with a more correct imputation of the pleasure that comes with the change, a natural bulwark is created, by which the isolated but strong animal passions are held in check. A habit will thus be acquired of ejecting from the consumption the discordant elements which prevent the formation of larger complements, and this habit will greatly strengthen the conscience when moral acts are in question.

This transformation of the consumption should be made on purely economic grounds. Each small evil should be as-

sociated with the concrete complement where it usually appears and is not to be allowed to amalgamate with other evils, forming a group so large as to disturb the normal order of the consumption. Do not bring in a great principle for a small end. Instead of using up the force of purely moral motives in getting the mechanism of morality in working order, economic motives which appeal to the same psychological principles should be employed, and the former reserved for a later period of a child's development, when he is more conscious of the subjective forces moulding his character. Conscious ethical training should be delayed until the economic motives are working in a normal way and have created the largest complements that the economic world can give.

Manual education furnishes excellent means for this end. It brings psychological principles into activity that are essential in morals, yet it secures its results by an appeal to motives that are active in the child. The pleasures it creates are at first weak, but they readily become parts of large complementary groups and thus control our actions. A greater variety is needed to satisfy the consumer trained in this way and he notices more quickly the lack of harmony which the absence of certain elements causes. The growth of artistic feelings creates a great complement of all the qualities seen by the eye ; manual skill brings the different forms of construction into relation with one another ; and cooking unites in the same way the various kinds of food.

The different ways in which paper can be folded causes the child to think of the various geometrical forms as one complement and he finds a greater pleasure from the harmony which he discovers through comparison. In sewing, the different kinds of stitching help to unite our clothing more closely into a complementary group. Complex associations arise which greatly increase the pleasure of the whole. It is easier to pass by association from one form to another and hence a defect is more jarring and a harmony more pleasing. The propensity to cut and destroy comes from the small

size of the groups of pleasures which the boy enjoys. If he associated in one group all the pleasures of the school room, a desire to injure the furniture would be held in check by the thought that it was a part of a group of pleasures and that he would reduce the pleasure of this group more than he would gain by his destructive act.

Compare the pleasure of a fisher and an observer of fish. The fisher thinks of the fish merely as a means of momentary enjoyment, a sensation with no associated pleasure. If he succeeds in landing the fish on the bank of the stream, the pleasure is complete. To the observer of fish, however, it is a part of nature. The brook, the trees, the birds, and other elements of natural scenery would lose a share of their beauty if the fish were absent from its place. His pleasure derived from nature is a unit due to the many pleasures that have blended into one complement, and no element can be lost without a serious reduction of the aggregate pleasure.

It is always possible for the teacher to aid his pupils in enlarging their groups of pleasures. Their capacity for enjoying associated pleasures gradually increases with their age and the teacher must be active in showing the natural groups into which their pleasures will unite. They must also be taught to eject the discordant elements which prevent the union of small into large complements. Too often the pleasures of children remain mere aggregates of sensations of a low character because they are unconscious of the increase of pleasure which a harmonious consumption will give.

In relation to the food supply there is a vast field for instruction. The grouping of food into the best combinations and the ejection of discordant elements are both matters of the greatest importance. Children should be taught how coarse foods and strong drinks would keep them from a full appreciation of the best combinations of food and they should be helped to form the habit of rejecting crude, isolated pleasures which prevent the formation of these larger groups.

In this way they will not only be better consumers of food, but also they will get into working order the moral mechanism upon which their ethical character will depend. Whoever would make mankind moral in a natural way must make his beginning and get his mechanism in operation in the economic world.

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